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Abstract— National governments across Europe are currently 
introducing electronic identity management systems for 
enhancing security and gathering more unified forms of 
authentication for online public services. A particular 
challenge of security system design is to cope with the suspense 
between security and usability. This is strongly reflecting in 
identity management where this suspense becomes very 
apparent. Thus, for the success of identity management 
systems a certain focus on user centricity is demanded. This 
paper analyzes the system in Austria with respect to important 
determinants of a citizen-centric identity management 
approach, deduced from security usability issues, interrelated 
with factors for user perception as provided by the Technology 
Acceptance Model. The result reveals a biased picture of user 
centricity with an essential need for a stronger consideration of 
user perception and the provision of additional benefits 
addressing a perceivable user value.  
Keywords - electronic identity management; user centricity; 
security usability; e-government; Austria; TAM 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the achievement of higher stages of interaction in 
online services and the increasing number of electronic 
transactions in different domains of everyday life, identity 
management (IDM) more and more becomes a crucial 
challenge in the information society as most transactions 
require user authentication. This is especially the case in the 
field of e-government, where IDM plays a particular role. 
The maturity of online public services allows users not just 
to obtain information but also to conduct transactions with 
public administration completely online via single sign-on 
(SSO). Currently, there is a rather broad scope of different 
concepts and technologies for authentication procedures in 
online services, which makes IDM a tricky task to cope with, 
especially for end-users. Therefore a number of countries in 
Europe are introducing systems for electronic identity 
management (e-IDMS) in order to improve security in online 
services and to set-up more harmonized forms of 
identification and the corresponding procedures. As these 
approaches at least aim to unify national IDM for e-
government, they have a special focus on their citizens as the 
primary user group. Hence, user centricity is an essential 
factor and a certain challenge in this context.  
A part of this work has been presented at the CENTRIC 
2009 conference and this paper is an extended version of our 
contribution [1]. It upgrades the findings in [1] by 
emphasizing on issues regarding security usability and ties 
them in with user perception as a key determinant for user 
centricity. 
Higher levels of security, efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of electronic communication and transactions 
are the major benefits that governments expect from a 
national e-IDMS, for the public administration itself as well 
as for citizens and businesses. Lips et al. postulate that e-
IDM becomes “the sine qua non of successful e-
government”, and highlight two perspectives that have been 
dominating up to now: “technical design” and “privacy 
advocacy” [2]. They argue for transcending the 
preoccupation with these essentially instrumental views 
towards analyzing the wider societal implications of this 
innovation and for paying greater attention to social design 
issues [3]. McKenzie et al. refer to challenges, policy 
dilemmas entailed by multiple goals and failures in past IDM 
approaches, which have spurred the debate on appropriate 
overall e-IDMS strategies [4]. A number of normative 
frameworks for e-IDMS that deal with user-centric aspects 
have been suggested such as the set of principles for security 
usability developed by Jøsang et al. [5], the Seven Laws of 
Identity from Cameron [6] or the findings of the PRIME 
project [7]. 
These initiatives underline the paradigm shift that IDM 
approaches are currently experiencing towards a stronger 
focus on the user. User-centric IDM is expected to provide 
an individual “full control of transactions involving her 
identity data” [8]. In terms of security systems, security 
usability evolved as a special research field and is an integral 
part of user centricity though with a strong focus on technical 
design issues. More recent approaches of user centricity go 
beyond technical design and highlight the importance of a 
stronger integration of further aspects: e.g., applying 
experiences and techniques of the field of human-computer 
interaction (HCI) such as psychological and social aspects of 
usability in order to encourage a design perspective that 
comprehends the user as a part of the system [9]. However, 
there are several different concepts and understandings of 
user centricity (cf. [8] [10]) and research on national e-IDMS 
in terms of this aspect has been neglected. IDM approaches 
in e-government have some major differences compared to 
private sector IDM, with other determining factors to 
incorporate [4]; above all, governments have to care for 
broader aims such as social inclusion and interoperability, 
and at the same time governments have coercive power, 
which may lower incentives to be responsive to citizen 
concerns. As these and similar aspects have not yet received 
adequate attention in research on user-centric design of a 
national e-IDMS, this paper aims to contribute to closing this 
gap. On the example of the Austrian system, the peculiarities 
of an e-IDMS are explained with regard to security usability 
in order to grasp challenging aspects of citizen centricity.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section II depicts the 
research design of the analysis. Section III elucidates general 
aspects of user centricity and the relation between security 
and usability. In Section IV, relevant determinants for user-
centric IDM approaches are suggested. This is followed by 
an explanation of the Austrian e-IDMS and its specific 
design in Section V. The pursuance of user centricity in the 
Austrian system is analyzed in Section VI, followed by 
explanations for the current situation and considerations 
about approaches to cope with major challenges (Section 
VII). Finally, in Section VIII, the results of this analysis are 
summarized and concluded. 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This paper analyzes national identity management from a 
user-centric point of view and makes a contribution to 
develop suitable approaches for overcoming the challenges 
in this domain. The analysis is based on a case-study of the 
national e-IDMS in Austria as a top-ranking EU-country in 
terms of e-government [11]. This study is part of a larger 
comparative research project on the introduction of national 
identity management systems in selected European countries. 
The empirical investigation (conducted in 2008) was a 
combination of several methods: A comprehensive literature 
review, an analysis of research papers, official documents, 
expert statements, technical reports and specifications, face-
to-face interviews with key decision-makers and 
stakeholders at different governmental levels that were 
involved in the innovation process; and practical tests of the 
e-IDMS. For the analysis of this paper, following research 
questions were identified: 
 What are the significant aspects of user centricity for 
security systems and which role do they play for 
identity management particularly in the context of e-
government? Starting with a brief introduction of 
user centricity in general, we focus on key 
parameters relevant for user-centric national IDM. 
 What are the major characteristics of the national e-
IDMS in Austria and how does it incorporate 
user/citizen-centric parameters and the user's 
perception of the system? After describing specific 
features and peculiarities of the Austrian system we 
analyze them with respect to parameters relevant for 
user centricity. 
 How balanced is the interplay between the relevant 
determinants for user centricity in the Austrian e-
IDMS and what are major challenges for avoiding a 
trade-off between security and usability? Based on 
findings of security usability combined with 
considerations about user perception shed light on 
the current situation regarding user centricity. 
 
Our methodological approach draws upon theoretical 
conceptualizations of user centricity, security usability as 
well as technical concepts in the field of identity 
management. The four basic architectural models of e-IDMS 
– siloed, centralized, federated and user-centric identity 
systems (cf. [5] [8] [12]) – show how technical IDM 
concepts evolved towards a user-centric architecture. Hence, 
we include these models in our analysis.  
As there are a lot of different views and 
conceptualizations of user centricity that do not provide a 
commonly accepted delineation of the concept or a universal 
set of criteria, our approach is also informed by key 
dimensions of user centricity identified as predominant in the 
relevant literature. As the aim of our paper is to analyze user-
centric aspects exceeding technical design, the methodology 
also orientates on Davis’ [13] already classical Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM), which provides a suitable 
framework for better understanding of user perception as it 
allows to grasp relevant determinants and explanations for 
the users willingness to get involved with a new technology. 
In terms of security systems and identity management, this is 
of special interest as the ambivalent relationship between 
usability and security demands for a stronger consideration 
of user perception in this domain.  
The TAM describes the interrelation between system 
characteristics, perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use 
(i.e., usability) and attitude for usage and actual usage 
behavior, i.e., the intention to use. Davis defines perceived 
usefulness as “the degree to which a person believes that 
using a particular system would enhance his or her job 
performance”. This addresses the users’ perceived level of 
potential improvement of workflows through the usage of 
ICT, i.e., which benefits users expect from system usage. 
Perceived ease of use (usability) is defined as “the degree to 
which a person believes that using a particular system would 
be free of effort”. Thus it refers to the users’ expectations of 
the systems usability and the efforts usage implies. These 
two factors form the users’ intention to use a technology and 
have impact on the individual attitude for usage of a system 
and thus on the resulting usage and acceptance of the system 
itself [14] [15]. 
III. ASPECTS OF USER CENTRICITY 
In general, user centricity can be described as the 
manifestation of a certain demand for more user-orientation 
in technology. Placing the user and his demands in the center 
of technology design should provide him more control and 
user value. The rapid technological progress and particularly 
the emergence of internet services played a certain role for 
the paradigm shift towards a user-centric view. The 
decentralized structure of the internet, distributed 
architectures and the increase of online service created 
further complexity and new user-requirements for the 
implementation of usable technologies and services in this 
context, with user centricity becoming an essential aspect. 
This reflects in many different domains and in particular in 
the field of e-government.  
A. The Suspense between Usability and Security 
In terms of security, user centricity is a particular 
challenge as it addresses the tense relation to usability. Zurko 
defined user-centered security as “security models, 
mechanisms, systems and software that have usability as a 
primary motivation or goal” [9]. The challenge is to give 
"end-users security controls they can understand and privacy 
they can control for the dynamic, pervasive computing 
environments of the future" [9]. This strongly reflects in the 
emerging field of identity management (IDM) as it is all 
about processing the user's personal data for identification. 
User-centric IDM has the central aim to give users control 
over their personal data and allow them to understand and 
manage how these data is being processed in different 
contexts [16].  
The importance of privacy issues and an adequate 
consideration of principles for data protection and privacy 
are obvious. But the technical realization of privacy and 
security is a complex task and it is challenging to implement 
a system that is both - secure and usable. Security systems 
often suffer from an imbalance between usability and 
security. As an understated security level undermines the 
objectives of the system, this imbalance is in many cases at 
the expense of usability.  
Moreover, Jøsang et al. also postulate “a very real 
difference” between the degree of security of a system in 
theory and its actual security. This underlines the potential 
trade-off between usability and theoretical security, as the 
intended protection of security systems strongly depends on 
the user’s understanding of the system [17]. The introduction 
of new security technologies such as e-IDMS brings further 
challenges to avoid this possible trade-off. Hence, usability 
“becomes a strategic issue in the establishment of user 
authentication methods” [18]. Generally speaking, a user-
centric e-IDMS should provide privacy protection and 
security as well as usability. The incorporation of security 
usability is essential for the success of secure technologies. 
B. Principles for Security Usability  
The existence of principles for security usability indicates 
the demand for suitable approaches to avoid this possible 
trade-off. One ancient and important attempt that influenced 
security design was provided by the Dutch cryptographer 
Auguste Kerckhoff. Already in 1883, he described six 
principles for security systems: 1. The system must be 
substantially, if not mathematically, undecipherable; 2. The 
system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the 
enemy without causing trouble; 3. It must be easy to 
communicate and remember the keys without requiring 
written notes, it must also be easy to change or modify the 
keys with different participants; 4. The system ought to be 
compatible with telegraph communication; 5. The system 
must be portable, and its use must not require more than one 
person; 6. Regarding the circumstances, in which such a 
system is applied, it must be easy to use and must neither 
require stress of mind nor the knowledge of a long series of 
rules. 
These principles had high impact on today’s security and 
cryptography systems and despite of their age, some are still 
relevant. Jøsang et al. [17] underline the particular 
importance of principles 3 and 6 for today’s system design. 
They tied in with Kerckhoff's principles and developed 
principles for security usability. They distinguish between 
principles for security action and security conclusion. A 
security action is triggered, when the system demands the 
user to produce some information or set a security 
mechanism, (e.g., entering a password is a typical security 
action). Security conclusion means the users’ ability, to 
recognize the security state of the system (e.g., knowing that 
a connection via SSL uses encrypted data transmission). The 
principles are based on the conclusion, that the intended 
protection provided by a security system strongly depends on 
the user’s capability to understand, which security actions 
and conclusions the system requires and to react 
appropriately. “Security systems will only be able to provide 
the indented protection when people actually understand and 
are able to use them correctly” [17].  
Another approach that deals with user-centric security is 
provided by Cameron’s seven laws of identity [6], which 
offers some important guidelines for user centricity in 
identity management systems. Similar to the principles of 
Jøsang et al., the rules for system design suggested by 
Cameron also focus on user understanding as a crucial factor 
for providing the intended level of security.  
User understanding is definitely a crucial aspect for user 
centricity that often suffers from exaggerated security claims. 
Hence, some authors (cf. [19] [20] [21]) question the 
effectiveness of common security advice and principles in 
this respect. For instance, minimum requirements for 
password security (e.g., length, combination of signs and 
numbers, etc.) might be of vast importance in theory. 
However, as they are often not practicable and security risks 
are rather abstract to users, they are more of a burden for 
them. Most security advice are simply too complex for being 
useful to end-users and do not fit their demands on the 
system. As a result, security mechanisms foil themselves and 
systems are often insufficient regarding user experience. 
IV. DETERMINANTS FOR A CITIZEN-CENTRIC IDM 
APPROACH IN E-GOVERNMENT 
The previous remarks show a certain demand for a 
consideration of further aspects that go beyond technical 
design issues. As this paper deals with national IDM in the 
field of e-government we emphasize on identifying crucial 
factors for user centricity in this respect. In order to highlight 
how user centricity concerns the technical design of an e-
IDMS, this Section starts with an overview of the basic 
models for identity management.  
A. Evolution of Technical ID Models 
There are four main types of ID models that can be 
distinguished: siloed, centralized, federated and user-centric 
systems. A siloed system is completely uncoupled from other 
systems with no formal connections with other IDMS. 
Hence, data processed within the IDMS is separated from 
other systems and cannot be easily linked across different 
domains. With respect to data protection and privacy this is a 
highly important aspect. However, due to this separation, a 
siloed system does not facilitate data sharing. Therefore it 
often does not fit the needs for an efficient data processing 
and sharing across multiple domains. Thus it allows no SSO 
either and users need multiple accounts when interacting 
with more than one system.  
The centralized approach aims to ease this 
inconvenience. In centralized systems all of a person’s data 
are stored in a repository managed by a central provider and 
independent from the applications using the data. This 
central repository is accessible to service providers, which 
can use it for their applications. Users are able to 
authenticate through one account. However, the potential 
threats to security and privacy are high in centralized 
systems as all personal data is being processed in one single 
unit and users are completely reliant on the central provider.  
The federated model represents a sort of mixture between 
the siloed and the centralized approach. Here, a central 
identity provider (IdP) manages data relevant for 
identification of a person and providers of services and 
claims (SP) can use these data. The federation allows linking 
up previously unlinked identifiers and SPs base their 
applications on one single authentication mostly without 
creating or maintaining user accounts on their own. Users 
only authenticate via one single account, which can be used 
for multiple services. Hence, a federated system offers more 
user convenience and reduces privacy threats of the 
centralized model as the IdP normally does not hold all 
personal data. However, as the IdP knows, which identifiers 
belong to a specific person, he has the ability to abuse this 
knowledge and breach the user’s privacy. Thus the 
functionality of a federated system strongly depends on the 
reliability of the IdP and the creation of a trustworthy 
infrastructure. 
To diminish the users’ dependence of a central IdP in a 
federated system, the user-centric model evolved. It has a 
certain focus on the person interacting with the system and 
offers her more control. There is no central IdP, users can 
choose between different SPs as well as IdPs. As identity 
providers dot not belong to a federation they are expected to 
act in the users’ interest rather than in those of the SPs. Due 
to this freedom of choice, which parties to trust and which 
information to reveal in a particular transaction, a person is 
more independent and can gain advanced reliability in a 
user-centric system. However, this extent of control also 
brings greater demands on the users’ skills to handle this [5] 
[8] [12]. 
B. (Preliminary) Parameters  
The relevance of user centricity for the success of e-
government is evident. Already in 2004, the mid-term review 
of the EU action plan eEurope 2005 attested a need for a 
“move to a demand-driven approach that emphasizes service 
delivery, end-user value for all and functionality” [22]. As 
citizens build a major subset of users in e-government, this 
paper focuses on citizen centricity in the context of 
electronic IDM and the term “user” mainly refers to the 
citizen. IDM in e-government is different from IDM in 
private sector. This difference demands for the consideration 
of other aspects. So as to realize a user/citizen-centric e-
government approach, Blakemore and Undheim appeal for 
“a clearer focus on technologies that use citizen-relevant 
channels to deliver citizen/public value, rather than just to 
deliver efficiency gains and cost savings” [23]. Governments 
have to ensure equal access to public services for all citizens. 
This implies the multi-channel principle, i.e., to offer 
alternative channels to government services (online as well 
as offline). Online public services should be usable with 
familiar technologies in order to “maximize inclusion and 
utility, and to avoid unnecessary demands (skills, device 
purchase etc.) on citizens” [23]. 
In [1] we identified three major factors for citizen 
centricity in national IDM:  
Equality of access: In e-government, IDM has to consider 
issues on a broader scope such as social inclusion, 
affordability, consistency, interoperability and the 
availability of public services for the whole population. 
Inclusiveness and providing non-exclusive access to public 
services via traditional as well as online channels to all 
citizens is a central requirement. Public services have to be 
accessible without e-ID as well and without any 
disadvantages in order to avoid a digital divide. The e-ID 
should reduce, not enlarge the distance between the citizens 
and public administration.  
Privacy protection: The consideration of data protection 
and privacy aspects as a core issue is of vast importance for 
IDM. Governments have the substantial duty to protect the 
citizen’s privacy and support them in controlling their 
personal data. Hence, a major requirement on a user-centric 
e-IDMS is its contribution to empowering users in managing 
their ID in a self-determined way. One crucial property “that 
must be satisfied in order to ensure privacy protection” is the 
unlinkability of personal data [24]. This means to avoid the 
use of unique identifiers, which are a threat to privacy 
because they can be used for „privacy-destroying linkage 
and aggregation of identity information across data contexts” 
[25]. Thus, different identifiers for every sector should be 
used, e.g., in the form of local pseudonyms [25]. Data 
processing in the e-IDMS has to be transparent to users so 
that they are able to comprehend how their personal data is 
being processed within the system.  
Citizen convenience: Improving convenience for users is 
a central issue for IDM, as it determines how the system 
responds to the citizens’ demands. This affects e-government 
in particular as public services should be usable for every 
citizen. The e-ID should support SSO and ease the users’ 
need to handle multiple accounts and the corresponding 
procedures. At the same time the e-ID should provide 
citizens’ a suitable and convenient way to deploy their e-ID 
in different contexts without the need for handling multiple 
login data and procedures. 
An additional factor in line with these parameters is trust. 
It is strongly interrelated with the other factors and 
particularly connected to the possible trade-off between 
security and usability. One might say trust is in between the 
poles of this possible trade-off: Security and trust are 
interdependent and determine each other in some respects. 
Lacking usability foils security and as a consequence also 
lowers trust in the system. When security mechanisms empty 
into high complexity, users are then not able to understand 
and consider them appropriately. One important aim of 
national IDM is to increase the amount of trust in e-
government. “Concepts of trust and identity have become 
intimately bound, and go beyond a purely technical focus” 
[26]. Government organizations require citizens to trust in 
them “in order to be legitimate and efficient” [27]. Applying 
a reliable environment for public service usage is an essential 
precondition for citizens’ trust in e-government. The e-IDMS 
should establish a solid fundament for trustworthy 
interactions between citizens and government with the 
assurance, that his personal data is treated correctly and not 
against his privacy [27]. 
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTRIAN E-IDMS AND 
SPECIFIC DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS 
First initiatives for a national e-IDMS already began in 
the early 90ies with plans to set up a smart card system in the 
field of social and health insurance administration. The 
European Directive (1999/93/EC of December 13 1999 on a 
Community Framework) for electronic signatures triggered 
further impulses at a European level. Austria was (among 
other EU-member states) directly involved in designing the 
signature and hence one of the first countries in Europe to 
implement a national e-IDMS for e-government services. In 
October 2000, the idea of a smart card for unique 
identification of citizens in a certain role – the so-called 
“Citizen Card” (in German called “Buergerkarte”) was born 
and announced as an integral part of Austria’s national 
conversion of the eEurope initiative “information society for 
all”. Shortly afterwards the government approved a 
resolution for the implementation of a smart card based 
system to support e-government services [28]. First 
prototypes of Citizen Cards were released during a pilot 
scheme and available from 2002 until 2005.  
As the system architecture for the Citizen Card (CC) 
follows a technology-neutral approach the concept is not 
bound to one specific card. Although plans during the 
development process aimed to use the electronic health 
insurance card (today known as “e-Card”) as primary device 
for the CC concept. Together with the ATM card, the e-Card 
became one of the major carrier devices to carry the CC-
function. 
A. Major system characteristics 
The Citizen Card as centerpiece of the Austrian e-IDMS 
has some specific characteristics. First of all, it strives for 
technology-neutrality and multiple tokens as it is not a 
physical card but a virtual concept that can be implemented 
on various different hardware components (e.g., smart cards, 
cell phones, USB devices) [29] . Due to their broad range of 
use, smart cards are currently the preferred carrier devices 
with e-Cards and ATM cards as main tokens. These cards are 
wide-spread among the Austrian population. Every citizen 
(8.3 million) has an e-Card and about 80% of the Austrians 
hold an ATM card. These cards have the “sleeping” CC-
function integrated, which means that they are prepared for 
the e-ID but the function needs initial activation. Ministerial 
IDs, staff IDs of the Chamber of Commerce and student IDs 
are some of the further possible carrier devices. The Citizen 
Card fulfills two basic functions in online transactions with 
public administration: it allows to verify the card holder’s 
identity and to authenticate his/her request by providing an 
electronic signature, which is stored on the card. A 
peculiarity of the e-IDMS is its ID model and the technical 
privacy concept: the system is based on a complex techno-
organizational infrastructure with an ID model that is 
grounded on unique identifiers in the Central Register of 
Residents (CRR), whereas sector specific identifiers (ssPINs) 
are derived from. The amount of data stored on the card 
depends on the specific carrier device. But every Citizen 
Card contains at least the card holder’s full name, date of 
birth, the source-PIN as unique identifier (for details see next 
Section) and the cryptographic public keys needed for the e-
signature and content-encryption. The private key is stored in 
a separate hardware unite on the cards’ chip. For protection 
of these data, up to three different PIN-codes that are only 
known by the card holder are applied. The first one is for 
general access protection of the device, the second one for 
using the e-signature and the optional third for the additional 
feature of an integrated data box for storing electronic 
documents such as a birth certificate [29] [30].  
B. Techno-organizational infrastructure and ID model 
The Austrian e-IDMS is based on a complex techno-
organizational infrastructure. This set-up can be explained 
regarding the CC’s two main functions – identification and 
e-signature. For the creation and provision of the e-signature, 
a Public key infrastructure (PKI) was established. The PKI 
consists of one or more Certificate Authorities (CAs) that 
issues all services relevant for the e-signature and 
Registration Authorities (RAs), where card holders can apply 
for an e-signature. (Currently, the institution a.trust is the 
only CA in Austria that applies qualified certificates required 
for the e-ID). This CA coordinates several RAs (i.e., banks, 
post offices, etc.), which usually provide the full activation 
of a Citizen Card including the integration of the ID model 
[29] [30].  
The core infrastructure component for the ID model is 
the Central Register of Residents (CRR). This register is a 
national database, which contains data of all Austrian 
residents. The primary key for every data-record is the CRR-
number, a 12-digit number, which acts as unique identifier 
for a specific person. The CC’s whole ID model is based 
upon the CRR-No. but not directly used to respect privacy 
protection. Hence only a strong encryption of the CRR-No. – 
the so-called source-PIN – is stored in the card to identify the 
card holder and the law prohibits storing it outside the card. 
The source-PIN is created during card activation and used 
for generating sector-specific PINs (ssPIN). An ssPIN is 
based on an irreversible cryptographic function, which 
prevents to recreate its original elements (i.e., the source-
PIN). Currently, there exist ssPINs for 26 sectors (e.g., tax, 
education, health, etc.). An ssPIN is used for unique 
identification of a person within the specific belong sector. 
Storage of an ssPIN is regulated by the law and only allowed 
within the sector it belongs to or is allowed to use it [30]. 
The Figure below gives an overview of the interrelations 
between the major infrastructure components.  
 
 
 
 
C. Requirements and user interaction with the e-IDMS 
Using the CC in online services requires the initial 
activation of the function. RAs carry out the corresponding 
procedures for the card holder. Until recently, this was only 
possible by visiting an office. Now the whole activation 
process can be carried out online as well with the 
precondition that the e-Card is the carrier device. For the 
handling of the CC, a PC with internet connection, a card 
reader and special software – the so-called Citizen Card 
environment (CCE) – are required. The CCE is available in 
different variants, including productions completely free of 
charge. In 2009, an online-variant of the software has been 
introduced. The activation for ATM cards costs 12 € once, 
and the certificate for the e-signature is 15.60 € per year.  
A typical user session with CC usually proceeds as 
follows: most public online services are available via SSO on 
the Austrian e-government portal help.gv.at. After choosing 
a service, the user is prompted to authenticate by putting his 
card into the card reader and entering a PIN-code. This 
grants the service access to the user’s ID data on the card in 
order to generate a confirmation for accessing the service 
(typically, it looks like this: “I, John Doe, born on January 
1st 1973, confirm that I am using this service. Date, time: 
January 12, 2010, 9:32:12”). This confirmation has to be 
signed by the user by entering his signature-PIN. Then, 
depending on the current service, some forms have to be 
filled out with personal data (e.g., income data for tax 
declaration). When submitting, the user is prompted again to 
sign another confirmation in order to affirm his service 
request and the correctness of his data. During submission, 
the service requests creation of the ssPIN in the back office, 
by reading the source-PIN out of the card and combining it 
with the unique number of the current sector the service 
belongs to (e.g., tax). After service completion the data is 
being further processed in the back office applications of the 
appropriate authority. It depends on the administrative 
procedure, whether data processing is completely automated 
or includes further treatment by the administration office 
[29] [30].  
VI. THE BIASED PICTURE OF A CITIZEN-CENTRIC VIEW ON 
THE AUSTRIAN E-IDMS 
This Section analyzes the realization of relevant 
determinants for citizen centricity (as described in Section 
IV) in the Austrian system and then strives for explanations 
of the biased picture that the analysis and the following 
delineations draw. 
A. Mapping of the e-IDMS against typical ID models 
A tentative attribution of the Austrian system to the four 
basic ID models as described in Section IV.A is revealed by 
the Table below: 
 
TABLE I. MAPPING OF THE E-IDMS 
 Siloed Centra
-lized 
Fede-
rated 
User-
centric 
Method of authentication   X  
Location of Identity 
Information 
 X X (X) 
Method of linking 
accounts/learning if they 
belong to the same person 
  X (X) 
Trust Characteristics 
(who is dependent on 
whom, for what) 
 (X) X  
Convenience   X (X) 
Vulnerabilities (X) X X  
 
As the basic models represent rather simplified “ideal-
types”, this mapping cannot be stringent, but still it gives an 
initial clue about the system with regard to citizen centricity. 
The user authenticates with the Citizen Card to each 
service via SSO, whereas the CRR is the central identity 
provider and supplies the ID data to service providers. 
Hence, the method of authentication correlates with the 
federated model. Regarding location of identity information, 
the e-IDMS is mainly a mixture of centralized, federated and 
user-centric model: all relevant ID information is centrally 
stored in the CRR that service providers can integrate in their 
separate accounts but identity verification usually requires 
the CC. Linking of data across different domains is 
prevented by the ssPINs and the corresponding legal 
regulations, i.e., it is only allowed to link data within the 
same sector or by offices permitted to process the data. But 
the identity provider knows in which services a user deploys 
his e-ID and the CRR contains more personal data than 
generally needed for every service. Thus, users have to trust 
that the federal identity provider and the service providers 
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RA 
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for user 
Central Register of 
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Creates 
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Figure 1: Techno-organizational infrastructure 
use their data properly and with respect to privacy. Due to its 
powerful role, the user is somewhat constrained by the 
federal identity provider. As service utilization with e-ID 
requires the CC as a separate device and PIN-codes, users 
gain more control. However at the same time they are also 
confronted with increased requirements to handle the e-ID. 
As SPs have to request the federal IdP for the creation of 
ssPINs, they are not completely liberated from the burden of 
credential management. Altogether, the Austrian e-IDMS 
mainly follows a federated approach, whereas some of its 
features strive for a user-centric system design.  
B. Provision for citizen centricity 
The e-IDMS incorporates a citizen-centric approach and 
the consideration of relevant aspects reflects in several ways. 
Regarding equality of access, different approaches have been 
employed to avoid social exclusion and exclusiveness of the 
e-IDMS; some of them especially during the rollout phase 
also in order to broaden penetration and stimulate usage of 
the system: to reduce financial burden, online transactions 
with the e-ID were free of charge until the end of 2006. 
Since 2008, there are no costs when using the e-Card as CC. 
The technology-neutral concept allows using several 
different devices as carrier for the e-ID. Due to the 
possibility to integrate the e-ID into different systems, it 
provides openness and interoperability at least to some 
extent. The e-ID is not compulsory and citizens are free to 
decide whether to use it or not. Austria provides a broad 
scope of different e-government services and of course, 
services are still available in traditional offline forms. Online 
services do not per se require the e-ID and can be used with 
common authentication methods (i.e., username/password) 
as well. Just a few services require the e-ID and only in 
cases, where the transaction should be processed completely 
online without any media friction. In this respect, the e-ID 
could also be noticed as enabler of an additional access-
channel. Due to the availability of multiple tokens, citizens 
also have some choice, which carrier device to use as Citizen 
Card. As there are no costs for using the e-Card, neither for 
activation nor for usage, most people are expected to prefer 
this device. 
For the consideration of privacy, the e-IDMS is based on 
a sophisticated ID model, which strives for a balance of 
security and data protection. As persistent static identifiers 
allow data linking across different domains, they enable 
potential privacy threats, i.e., identity fraud or infringement 
of personal information [4]. Hence, the Austrian e-IDMS is 
based on a complex ID model, which avoids the direct 
processing of a unique identifier (as described in Section V). 
The use of the ssPINs aims to prevent illegal linkage of 
personal data. These identifiers are different for a defined 
number of domains (currently 26), and legal regulations limit 
the use of an ssPIN to the domain it origins from or is 
allowed to use it. Moreover, it is also prohibited to 
persistently store the source-PIN (as basis-number for an 
ssPIN) outside the Citizen Card. This technical sector 
separation corresponds to the deployment of different 
pseudonyms. As the e-IDMS applies an electronic token in 
form of a hardware device, users receive at least some 
control over their personal data. The combination of 
knowledge (the PIN-code) and possession (the card) 
improves security of the authentication procedure compared 
to usual concepts, which are based on username/password.  
The system contributes to enhance citizen convenience as 
it provides a comprehensive approach to harmonize 
authentication procedures. Most Austrian e-government 
services are available at the e-government portal help.gv.at 
and citizens can use their CC to authenticate at this single 
entry-point via SSO. With the CC as one device to 
authenticate in different services, identity management is 
alleviated as citizens do not have to handle several user 
accounts and credentials. The openness of the concept to 
different carrier devices gives users the possibility to choose 
their preferred token for the CC-function. The possibility of 
activating the e-Card completely online offers a convenient 
way to enable it as carrier medium. Beside the two main 
carrier cards (e-Cards, ATM cards) there was also a CC 
available on a cell phone without needing a smart card or 
card reader. A legal provision allowed this so-called “Citizen 
Card light”, which had less security requirements. As the 
legal regulation was only temporarily, the “Citizen Card 
light” was only available until the end of 2007. In November 
2009, an improved version of the CC on a cell phone has 
been announced and is available since 2010 [31]. An 
additional online version of the CCE is available since 2009, 
which is completely browser-based and thus reduces efforts 
as users do not have to install additional software 
components.  
The techno-organizational infrastructure of the e-IDMS 
contributes to create a circle of trust. The involved parties 
(CA, RA, IdP, SPs) have to fulfill certain requirements, 
which are legally defined (e.g., in legal regulations for e-
signature, privacy, administrative procedures, etc.). The Data 
protection commission serves as a custodian over the lawful 
appliance of the e-IDMS. The Ministry of the Interior 
administrates the CRR and acts as central identity provider 
on behalf of the DPC. Service providers have to register their 
applications and to request for deploying their services with 
the CC. Due to the privacy aware system implementation 
and the increased amount of control, the e-IDMS seems to be 
grounded on a reliable fundament that is capable of 
enhancing citizens’ trust in e-government. 
C. Current usage and acceptance of the system  
With the two main carrier devices – e-Card and ATM 
cards – the penetration of potential CC is high as these cards 
are wide-spread in Austria and already prepared for the CC-
function. There is also a number of services available that 
can be used with the CC at all three administrative levels 
(federal, provincial, municipal) at the Austrian e-government 
portal. However, there is no significant increase in card 
activation and usage although the Citizen Card is obtainable 
for several years already. The optimistic goals for the 
number of card activations had to be adjusted downwards 
several times. E.g., the intended number of 200,000 active 
CCs by the end of 2005 was not achieved. In 2006, only 
about 60,000 activated cards were in use and a substantial 
part of these are bulk activations by public organizations [1] 
[32]. According to recent estimates of the Federal 
Chancellery, about 120,000 were circulating by May 2009 
[33].  
A look at the usage levels of three exemplarily online 
services reveals some peculiarities [1]: 
 
TABLE II.  USAGE OF SERVICES IN 2007 
Transactions Total  Total - online Citizen Card 
Tax declarations Approx. 
4,000.000 
1,846.922 
(46%) 12.801 (0.7%) 
Student grants*) 66.933 53 (0.1%) 53 (0.1%) 
Retirement pay 
account **) 35.974 10.485 (29.1%) 10.485 (29.1%) 
*) Data refer to academic year 2007/08. **) Data refer to 2008. 
 
There are some remarkable differences in usage of these 
services. The number of transactions for tax declaration is of 
particular interest as it is considerably higher compared to 
the other services. It is the most successful e-government 
application in Austria; the amount of citizens transmitting 
their tax declaration online is close to 50%. However, the 
vast majority prefers common authentication based on 
username and password. Less than 1% uses the CC for this 
service. As online processing of the two other services 
requires authentication with CC, the number of online 
transactions equals the number of transactions with Citizen 
Card. The comparatively higher amount of citizens using the 
online service for retirement pay account queries is 
explainable by the significantly higher number of potential 
users (students only represent a small share of the 
population) as well as strong advertising and PR actions 
taken for e-health and social services during the roll out of 
the e-Card, which received increased public attention.  
D. Explaining the current situation  
The usage level is only progressing very slowly and a 
remarkable increase as expected by the main stakeholders 
has not occurred yet. Despite of the important considerations 
of citizen centricity in the Austrian system, the overall 
situation draws a rather biased picture.  
In order to identify explanations for this situation it is 
expedient to take up a more general view on the e-IDMS as a 
security system, as this allows gaining a better understanding 
of relevant determinants. From this point of view, the e-ID 
represents a certain security mechanism for citizens when 
interacting with public administration. Users are mostly 
considered to be the soft spot of a security system that often 
neglect the proper use of security mechanisms. This 
negligence is often stated as irrational or ascribed to the 
users’ lack of understanding the security mechanism. 
However, a closer look shows that users act “entirely 
rational” when rejecting security advice, as [21] argues: “A 
main part of the problem with security advice is that we 
hugely exaggerate benefits”. Additionally, the cost of user 
effort is often ignored [21]. Security systems and the 
corresponding requirements overwhelm users and offer them 
“a poor cost-benefit tradeoff”. Therefore, security 
mechanisms are often rejected by users as the high 
requirements made of users do not match the predicted 
benefits. Users are confronted with a real effort to handle a 
security system while at the same time this effort should 
prevent from threats that are rather theoretical [20] [21]. 
Applications with an exclusive focus on security mostly 
offer “a small perceived advantage in exchange for dealing 
with an extraordinary complex interface” [19].  
These remarks can also be transferred to the situation of 
the Austrian system. The high complexity of the e-IDMS 
plays a certain role for the user experience and thus is a 
major vulnerability of the system, which has been a central 
point of criticism and entails further controversial aspects. 
Although the sophisticated ID model was designed to 
prevent data linkage and protect the citizens’ privacy, the 
effectiveness of this solution is questioned. As online service 
process many personal data, illegal data linkage is still 
feasible over these data, despite of the deployment of ssPINs. 
The complex coherences of the system cause a lack of 
transparency, which does not allow users to comprehend 
how their e-ID and the related data are being processed 
within the system. This also limits the users’ amount of 
control over their personal data. Essential requirements for 
preventing the e-ID to become an instrument of surveillance 
are effective controls of the maintenance of fundamental 
privacy principles (e.g., commensurability, data 
minimization, purpose limitation of data processing, etc.). 
Due to the high overall complexity and opacity of the 
system, this controllability of a proper data processing in 
account with privacy is rather hard to ensure. Lacking 
transparency and high complexity can also be expected to 
lower the citizens’ level of trust in the e-IDMS. Overall, the 
e-IDMS and especially the CC are perceived as too complex 
with several flaws regarding citizen centricity. Benefits and 
convenience are rather low compared to the high 
requirements made of users [32] [34].  
These propositions address several serious aspects, which 
indicate the suspense between usability and security in the 
Austrian system in several contexts. There is some certain 
evidence for this assessment. Two studies revealed some 
interesting indications for the situation: In the “eUser” study 
of 2005, 27% of the Austrian Internet users described the 
need for a special end-user device for identification (i.e., the 
CC) as a burden for using online public services. Costs were 
estimated as too high compared to the expected benefits of 
the CC [35]. According to another study from 2006, 33% of 
the respondents mentioned to have no intention to obtain a 
CC at all. The reasons stated for this correspond to the 
propositions above: There is no or not enough need for the 
CC (46%), lack of information about usage (37%), the CC is 
not trustworthy enough (22%). Furthermore, 38% of the 
respondents that stated to be card holders mentioned to never 
have used their CC [36].  
When considering the high requirements for usage (card 
activation, card reader, installation of special software), it is 
not very unlikely that handling of the e-ID is perceived as 
burden. Several problems and obstacles in practical use also 
appear from entries in the online support-forum for CC 
users.1 Practical tests conducted for this research confirmed 
the non-trivial and partly complicated handling of the e-ID. 
Indeed, the number of security actions and conclusions (cf. 
[16]) demanded from the user often seems to be over 
exaggerated and beyond a standard users understanding of a 
common system. 
Beside the problem of high complexity, from a user’s 
perspective, the system does not seem to offer enough 
benefits and incentives. The marginal rate of contacts for a 
citizen with public administration (only approx. 1.7 contacts 
per year) and the existence of common and fairly effective 
authentication methods are important aspects in this context 
[1]. This, combined with the exaggerated efforts of using the 
e-ID may considerably account for a weak benefit/cost ratio 
(whereas costs do not primarily address financial expense, 
but a disproportional effort). Thus, the e-IDMS provides 
only a low user value.  
It has to be noted that major stakeholders are aware of 
this situation and since the mentioned studies have been 
conducted, several measures were set to improve citizen 
centricity and increase diffusion. The measures mainly 
address the reduction of costs and usability problems: e.g., 
no charges for the e-Card, promotion of cost-reduced 
notebooks with integrated card reader and pre-installed 
software, an additional online version of the CCE and the re-
launched option of a cell phone based CC. To increase 
penetration and usage, several promotion campaigns mainly 
target teenagers and students. However, at present it is 
uncertain whether these actions are adequate to cope with the 
current situation and increase the level of usage. 
VII. IMPROVING USER CENTRICITY BY (RE-)FOCUSING ON 
THE USER VALUE  
The previous Section has shown that, although the 
Austrian system seems to consider several citizen-centric 
aspects the actual situation is not satisfying regarding usage 
and acceptance. This leads to the TAM as its aim is to 
identify relevant determinants for acceptance or rejection of 
a technology. A classification of the current situation to the 
two factors of the TAM, usefulness and ease of use, confirms 
the biased picture depicted and offers further explanations. 
The benefits a user expects from the system are addressed by 
the factor perceived usefulness. The ease of use addresses the 
costs and efforts that system usage entails. Now it has been 
pointed out that these efforts are perceived as rather high 
because citizens are confronted with additional requirements 
(i.e., card activation, card reader, special software) and the 
overall complexity of the system is perceived as too high.  
At a first glance, the reduction of complexity might come 
into mind as necessary approach for easing the situation and 
improving citizen centricity. Reducing complexity certainly 
is important to lower current burdens to usage. But does this 
also stimulate usage? At least in the Austrian case this effect 
did not occur: stakeholders took several measures in this 
regard to alleviate handling of the e-ID. However, it is 
currently not foreseeable whether these actions will be 
                                                            
1 http://tinyurl.com/c9kuvn 
effective. Moreover, the scope of action for reducing 
complexity might be limited with respect to the intended 
security level. Plus, a deviation from the sophisticated ID 
model of the Austrian e-IDMS cannot be expected to be 
performed easily without enormous efforts and problems 
regarding privacy protection. 
In this regard, a rather interesting aspect is pointed out by 
Gutmann and Grigg: users do accept “a little more 
complexity (…) for a fair offering in value” [18]. Davis [13] 
argued similar, whereby “(…) users are often willing to cope 
with some difficulty of use in a system that provides 
critically needed functionality”. This implies a stronger focus 
on finding a balance between acceptable complexity and user 
value. It might seem obvious that system usage is strongly 
interdependent with the benefits users can expect. But as 
already underlined in the previous Section, this determining 
issue seems to be neglected especially in terms of security 
and identity management systems. Hence, “cost and benefits 
have to be those the users care about, not those we think the 
user ought to care about” [20]. Costs are not just meant in a 
monetary sense here but subsume all the efforts that users are 
confronted with. When the transaction costs incurred by 
switching from familiar forms of identification to the e-ID 
are high and the expected benefits due to this switching are 
low then usage is expected to be low either.  
In accord with the TAM it thus strongly depends on the 
perceived usefulness of the e-IDMS, whether users are 
willing to accept a certain degree of complexity. The 
difficulty of usage can surely contribute a lot to “discourage 
adoption of an otherwise useful system”, but “no amount of 
ease of use can compensate for a system that does not 
perform a useful function” [13].  
The analysis has already shown that the system does not 
seem to offer enough benefits and incentives. Whilst the 
scope of available services is relatively broad, at the same 
time, the average frequency of citizen contacts per year is 
relatively low. Hence the incentives to access these services 
via CC are marginal and the usefulness is perceived as too 
low either. 
When considering the recent measures of major 
stakeholders, it is salient that the ease of use, respectively the 
usability of the e-IDMS seems to receive more attention than 
usefulness. Hence there is a certain demand for increasing 
benefits and creating a “real” user value, which implies, that 
service provision plays a crucial role for user centricity in the 
e-IDMS. From a user’s point of view, current services with 
e-ID do not considerably differ from common e-government 
services except of the authentication method. An important 
step forward might be finding out, which additional benefit 
of the e-ID citizens would really appreciate. For instance 
services, that offer new possibilities for interaction with 
public administration and that legitimate the sophisticated 
concept behind the system. At its current state, the e-IDMS 
seems to be less suitable as an instrument for standard-users 
than for users with special demands. For instance, the 
number of citizens with a frequent use for the e-signature and 
document encryption yet seems rather marginal. This might 
be different in businesses with a certain demand for this 
application and the security level provided by the e-ID. 
Major stakeholders also rated the business sector as crucial 
for further diffusion.  
A certain additional value for citizens could be to 
enhance transparency of government actions: e.g., to grant 
users access to administrative documents that pertain to 
themselves and to provide information about current 
administrative proceedings in terms of freedom of 
information, of course with respect to privacy and data 
protection issues. Here, trust as an important aspect comes in 
again. Freedom of information laws appears “to have 
contributed to citizens showing higher levels of comfort 
about how their information will be handled" [4]. Or in other 
words: when citizens are able to comprehend how their 
personal data is being processed in public administration, 
this contributes to increase trustworthiness in government, 
which represents an important incentive. From a privacy 
perspective, transparency is essential as surveillance can only 
be effectively controlled and prevented when information 
about purpose of e-ID usage and processing are definitely 
regulated and accessible for citizens [34]. Applications for e-
ID in terms of freedom of information would also be 
conducive to improve effectiveness of privacy as it 
contributes to improve an individuals’ control over his e-ID 
respectively his personal data. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the Austrian e-IDMS regarding its 
incorporation of citizen centricity reveals a biased picture: 
although the system includes important citizen-centric 
factors and several measures were set to reduce complexity 
and alleviate handling of the e-ID, the level of usage and 
acceptance of the system does not meet the expectations of 
major stakeholders. This ambivalent result highlights that the 
intentions behind the e-IDMS regarding end-users do not 
seem to match the users’ perceptions of the system. The 
implementation of the Austrian system was dominated by 
strong focus on security. This entailed a high overall 
complexity, which is a particular burden for acceptance and 
usage. However, measures to reduce this complexity have 
not lead to the intended effects yet. In this respect, the e-
IDMS indeed reflects the depicted suspense between security 
and usability. The crucial challenge for security systems in 
general and e-IDMS in particular is to find suitable 
approaches for avoiding this suspense. First and foremost 
this implies a stronger focus on providing a “real” user value. 
This seemingly rather obvious finding addresses the 
necessity for a paradigm shift in system design to 
compensate the mismatch between design philosophy behind 
the system and the usability needs regarding security 
usability from a user’s view.  
An important step towards finding suitable approaches 
for easing this situation is to emphasize on user perception as 
determinant of vast importance for user centricity. The 
deployment of the TAM allowed to conclude that this 
necessary focus is currently rather neglected in the e-IDMS. 
The measures taken mainly address the ease of usage (i.e., 
increase usability) whilst the usefulness of the system (i.e., 
the expected benefits) is left behind. Hence, there is a certain 
demand for further efforts to improve usefulness, which 
mainly concerns service provision and the creation of 
additional user value. Whilst the e-ID in its current state inter 
alia suffers from the end-users irregular demand, businesses 
might have a more frequent need.  
The Austrian case-study provided a useful example about 
the importance of considering further aspects in system 
design that go beyond technical issues in order to gain an 
expedient level of user centricity. These aspects refer to 
complex interrelations among multiple scopes especially in 
terms of e-government. The major challenge in this regard is 
to balance multiple goals, i.e., to provide a certain level of 
security, protect the citizens’ privacy and offer both usable 
and useful features from a citizen’s perspective. Necessary 
adaptations do not just address the technical design of the 
system but might also include further actions to take, i.e., 
reconfigurations of policy frameworks and legal regulations 
for e-ID usage. Furthermore, governments neither are nor 
should they be in a position to simply introduce additional 
services as this is a matter of checks and balances. Hence, a 
focus on improving transparency for citizens could 
contribute to experience user value. An additional benefit 
citizens could appreciate might be to facilitate access to 
government information and administrative proceedings that 
concern them. This institutionalization of freedom of 
information would also contribute to improve trust in (e-) 
government. As the e-IDMS represents an innovation, a 
rather tentative increase in acceptance and usage does not 
seem surprising. However, when this technology should 
establish itself in a mid-term perspective, this requires by all 
means the composition of further measures in order to strive 
for a more balanced provision of citizen centricity with 
respect to its multiple determinants. 
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